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We develop a Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods that are ordered
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1 Introduction
In November 2001, a new round of multilateral trade talks, the so-called Doha Development
Agenda, has been launched under the auspice of the World Trade Organization. Among
the issues to be discussed are better access of poor countries to cheap generic drugs, the
cuts of tariﬀs on industrial goods, and freer trade in agricultural products. Especially the
latter has made politicians and negotiators of the developed countries to dub the current
trade negotiations as the ‘development round’. Due to the comparative advantage devel-
oping countries allegedly have in these industries, better access to the heavily distorted
agricultural markets of developed countries is believed to be extremely beneﬁcial for many
developing countries in the world. This is what standard trade theory suggests and which
has been empirically substantiated by the many studies that emerged in the wake of the
launch of the Doha round talks.
This insight, however, is typically based on models where preferences are identical and
homothetic, that is, where all goods have the same unitary income elasticities and where
poor and rich households consume the available goods in the same proportion. This renders
the income distribution irrelevant for explaining trade and the consequences of trade liber-
alization. In such models, trade is solely explained by diﬀerences in production conditions
between countries and is not related to income diﬀerence across countries, nor to income
diﬀerences within countries. For trade between developed and developing countries, this
might be considered an heroic assumption. For instance, though supply conditions are
certainly relevant for explaining trade between developed and developing countries, see e.g.
Dosi et al. (1988), there is also empirical evidence that trade ﬂows are generated by diﬀer-
ences in per capita income across countries, e.g. Hunter and Markusen (1988) and Hunter
(1991). The lower is the income level the more likely it is that the poorest households
are isolated from the broader economy. This might imply that lower trade taxes do not
get passed through to those households, simply because it is not something they consume
yet. Consequently, the welfare of poor households might be aﬀected more by increasing
household incomes per se, which allows them to expand consumption baskets, than by re-
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ducing prices of goods that they did not consume in the ﬁrst place. Standard trade models
based on homothetic preferences are not suitable to address these issues, even though they
seem highly relevant in assessing the consequences of better market access for developing
countries.
In this paper we therefore abandon the assumption of homothetic preferences and look
at the consequences of trade liberalization when preferences are nonhomothetic. To this
end we use the Ricardian trade model developed by Matsuyama (2000), which builds on the
well-known Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) framework, and extend it to include
trade taxes. The production side is characterized by a continuum of goods which oﬀers great
analytical convenience. As in Matsuyama, but contrary to Dornbusch et al., commodities
are ordered in terms of desirability and consumers are satiated after the consumption
of one unit. Goods at the lower end of the spectrum are consumed by all households.
When household income increases this takes the form of increased consumption of higher-
indexed goods, and not of increased consumption of the same goods. Indeed, this is the
manifestation of nonhomothetic preferences, as it can be seen as a stylized representation
of goods having diﬀerent income elasticities. To apply the model to trade liberalization
between developed and developing countries, we assume that the world consists of two
countries: a poor, developing Home country and a rich, developed Foreign country. The
low-income country has a comparative advantage in the production of the lower range of
goods and specializes in goods with low income elasticity of demand. Foreign, on the other
hand, has a comparative advantage in the production of the higher-spectrum of goods and
hence is specialized in the commodities with high income elasticity of demand.
The inclusion of nonhomothetic preferences leads to three important results. First,
trade liberalization does not necessarily lead to a deterioration of the terms of trade of the
country that initiates the liberalization, as would be the outcome in standard models of
trade. Consequently, the welfare of the incipient country may increase due to a terms of
trade eﬀect. The general inference is that a country gains from a unilateral tariﬀ reduction
when its factor terms of trade improves, regardless which country lowers the tariﬀs. When
the terms of trade deteriorate, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction is detrimental for a country,
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unless it is the incipient country. Second, the inclusion of nonhomothetic preferences also
implies that the redistribution of tariﬀ revenues within countries does aﬀect aggregate
variables since it inﬂuences a country’s income distribution. As such, trade liberalization
might aﬀect the eﬃcacy of governmental income redistribution policies. As our results
indicate, in the presence of nonhomothetic preferences, the eﬀects of trade liberalization
become less positive for the poor in society, and might even become negative, when a
government pursues an income redistribution policy in favour of the poor. Third, our
framework provides an explanation for new industries to appear in the rich country due
to trade liberalization, while some of its older industries move to the developing country.
These eﬀects can be seen as the standard gains of (further) specialization, but at the same
time indicate the existence of product cycles. When preferences are nonhomothetic it
appears that the birth of new industries is primarily driven by the higher purchasing power
of rich households in the rich country. This implies that the more pro poor the income
redistribution policy of a government is, the more eﬀective trade liberalization is in spurring
the birth of new industries.
This paper is also closely related to Wilson (1980) who generalizes the Dornbusch et
al. model to many countries and some nonhomothetic preferences. He shows that many of
the comparative static results derived by Dornbusch et al. carry over provided that goods
are gross substitutes and diﬀerences in income elasticities are not too large. However, it is
not clear how his comparative static results change when there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in income elasticity and goods are not gross substitutes due to the loss of tractability of
his model. In contrast to Wilson and in the spirit of Matsuyama, we provide a tractable
model and analyze the eﬀects of trade policy when income elasticities diﬀer signiﬁcantly
across countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the model and derives the
initial, tariﬀ distorted equilibrium. Section 3 starts the discussion on the eﬀects of various
trade policies when preferences are nonhomothetic, but disregards income distribution ef-
fects by assuming homogeneous population. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the
implications of asymmetric demand complementarities. Section 4 considers diﬀerences in
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income distribution and investigates the eﬀect of trade liberalization under the assumption
of various tariﬀ revenue distribution schemes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There is a continuum of competitive industries, indexed by z ∈ [0,∞), each producing a
homogenous good also indexed by z. There is one factor of production, labor, which is
supplied in ﬁxed quantity and denoted by L and L∗ for the Home country and the Foreign
country, respectively. As usual, an asterisk denotes the Foreign country. For good z, let a(z)
be the unit labor requirement in the home country and a∗(z) the unit labor requirement
in the Foreign country. We deﬁne a∗(z)/a(z) as the ratio of domestic to foreign labor
productivity and follow standard practice and rank commodities in order of diminishing
home comparative advantage:
a∗(z)
a(z)
≡ A(z). (1)
The function A(z) is assumed to be continuous and strictly decreasing in z, A′(z) < 0.
We start from a situation in which trade ﬂows are distorted by tariﬀs. Let τ = 1+ t be
one plus the ad valorem tariﬀ imposed by Home when importing good z from Foreign. And
similarly for Foreign. All goods traded face a uniform tariﬀ rate. Then, assuming perfect
competition, prices will adjust and Home imports any commodity z from Foreign for which
wa(z) ≥ τw∗a∗(z) or w ≥ τA(z) (2)
when we choose the foreign wage rate as numéraire (w∗ = 1), so that the home wage rate
w is also Home’s factor terms of trade. Similarly, Foreign imports any commodity z from
Home for which
A(z) ≥ τ ∗w. (3)
As is well known, cost barriers to importing lead to a range of commodities that are not
traded. By imposing equalities in (2) and (3) we deﬁne borderline commodities. Thus
z˜ is the borderline between the home country’s nontraded commodities and the foreign
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country’s exports and z˜∗ represents the borderline between the home country’s exports and
Foreign country’s nontraded commodities:
z˜∗ = A−1(τ ∗w)
z˜ = A−1(w/τ )
which implies z˜∗ < z˜, since τ , τ ∗ > 1.
Since A(z) is decreasing in z, (2) and (3) imply that the home country produces all
z ∈ [0, z˜] and the foreign country all z ∈ [z˜∗,∞). Commodities z ∈ [0, z˜∗] are exclusively
produced in Home and exported, since Home’s inherent cost advantage in these goods is
high enough to outweigh the trade taxes. At the same time, Foreign’s cost advantage in
z ∈ [z˜,∞) is so high that those higher-indexed goods are exclusively produced there and
exported. Goods z ∈ (z˜∗, z˜) deﬁne an intermediate range of goods that both countries
produce but do not trade. Productivity diﬀerences are not high enough to outweigh the
trade taxes and engage in trade. Local prices are thus determined by
p(z) = min{wa(z), τa∗(z)}
p∗(z) = min{a∗(z), τ ∗wa(z)}.
The equilibrium z˜∗ and z˜ are determined by the interaction of demand and technology.
Regarding the demand side, suppose there are N households in the home country and
N ∗ in the foreign country. We follow Matsuyama (2000) and assume that the income
distribution is nondegenerated and brought about by diﬀerences in skills and reﬂected in
diﬀerences in eﬀective labor supply. Let F (h) and F ∗(h∗) be the distribution of eﬀective
labor supply across households in the home country and the foreign country, respectively.
The total labor supply thus equals L = N
∫
∞
0
hdF (h) in Home and L∗ = N∗
∫
∞
0
h∗dF ∗(h∗)
in Foreign. Since N and N ∗ are ﬁxed, both countries’ labor supplies are ﬁxed as well.
The consumption set of a household includes a continuum of z ∈ [0,∞). All house-
holds have identical preferences and maximize V =
∫
∞
0
b(z)x(z)dz subject to the budget
constraint
∫
∞
0
p(z)x(z)dz ≤ I. In these expressions, b(z) > 0 is the utility received of
consuming good z and x(z) = {0, 1} denotes the ‘quantity’ a household consumes. Thus,
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following Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), we assume that units come in discrete units
and that household’s desire to consume good z is satiated after the consumption of one
unit. This has the strong implication that, in contrast to standard analysis, an increase
in the utility is reﬂected in the consumption of an increased number of goods rather than
in the consumption of higher quantities of a ﬁxed number of goods. As such, wealthier
households consume all the goods consumed by poor households, plus some. The order in
which each household purchases goods is assumed to be the same as the order of goods
due to comparative advantage. Hence, we assume that households purchase lower-indexed
goods ﬁrst and when income increases extend their consumption to higher-indexed goods,
which indeed is a characterization of nonhomothetic preferences. This requires that the
order of utility per unit price is strictly decreasing in z, that is, we assume
b(z)
p(z)
=
b(z)
min{wa(z), τa∗(z)}
b(z)
p∗(z)
=
b(z)
min{a∗(z), τ ∗wa(z)}
is strictly decreasing in z for given w, τ , and τ ∗. In combination with our assumptions on
relative factor productivity and the ranking of factor intensity, this implies that the home
country has a comparative advantage in the production of lower-range goods for poorer
households, whereas the Foreign country has a comparative advantage in the production
of higher-range goods that are purchased by richer households.
Since each country levies tariﬀs on each others imports, a home household has two
potential sources of income: wage income and revenues from trade taxes. We assume
that the tariﬀ revenues each household generates by its own, household-speciﬁc spending
on imported goods, if any, are collected by the government and redistributed across all
households in a lump-sum fashion. Denoting these tariﬀ rebates by TR, the highest-indexed
commodity a home household is able to consume, u(h), is determined by the requirement
that
E[u(h)] = wh+ TR. (4)
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Equation (4) states that the utility level a household in the home country attains when
consuming u(h) is V (h) = B(u(h)) where B(z) ≡
∫
z
0
b(s)ds. This shows that V (h), the
level of utility attained by a household, maps one-to-one into u(h), the highest-indexed
good it consumes. The latter can therefore be used as a measure of utility.
Similarly, Foreign produces high-indexed commodities and imports the lower-indexed
goods from the home country paying a tariﬀ inclusive price for every good z imported.
Denoting foreign tariﬀ rebates by TR∗, the highest range good the foreign household con-
sumes, u∗(h∗), is given by:
E[u∗(h∗)] = h∗ + TR∗. (5)
The utility the foreign household achieves is V ∗(h∗) = B(u∗(h∗)).
Tariﬀ revenues in Home and Foreign are a function of expenditures and since tariﬀ
revenues are part of household income, total tariﬀ revenues are a function of themselves.
If importing, home households import only z ∈ (z˜,∞) paying (τ − 1)a∗(s) for each unit
consumed multiplied by total demand. This generates total tariﬀ revenues of
T = (τ − 1)
∫
∞
z˜
a∗(z)Q(z)dz
where Q(z) denotes total home demand for good z as speciﬁed by (9). Similarly, foreign
households import only goods in z ∈ [0, z˜∗] paying τwa(z) per unit imported. Hence,
T ∗ = (τ ∗ − 1)
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(z)Q∗(z)dz
where Q∗(z) denotes total foreign demand for good z as speciﬁed by (9). After some
algebra, this becomes
T = (τ − 1)N
∫
∞
0
max {wh + TR− E(z˜), 0} dF (h) (6)
T ∗ = (τ ∗ − 1)N ∗
∫
∞
0
min {h∗ + TR∗, E(z˜∗)} dF ∗(h∗). (7)
We assume for now that governments distribute tax revenues equally across households,
that is TR = T/N and TR∗ = T ∗/N ∗.
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We now turn to the labor markets and examine how the derived demand for labor de-
pends upon the demand for ﬁnal goods. We assume that households diﬀer only with respect
to their income. These diﬀerences in household income are obviously due to diﬀerences in
h, but also depend on the redistributive policies of local governments.
Since the home country produces only goods in [0, z˜] of which [0, z˜∗] are exported, labor
market equilibrium in Home requires that labor supply equals labor demand:
N
∫
∞
0
hdF (h) =
∫
z˜
0
a(z)Q(z)dz +
∫
z˜
∗
0
a(z)Q∗(z)dz. (8)
The left hand side of (8) represents Home’s labor supply as the ‘adding up’ of the eﬀective
labor supplies of individual households. The right hand side of (8) is the derived demand
for Home’s labor, i.e., specifying how the demand for labor depends upon the total demand
for good z. Since good z is purchased by households whose income is higher than E(z),
and no household buys more than one unit of any good, total demand for good z consists
of the sum of households in both countries whose income is higher than E(z):
Q(z) = N [1− F (E(z)− TR)/w)]
Q∗(z) = N ∗[1− F (E(z)− TR∗)].
(9)
Labor market equilibrium for the home country can be derived by equating the total
income earned in the economy to worldwide expenditures on home goods. This yields,
wL = N
∫
∞
0
min {wh+ TR,E(z˜)} dF (h)
+N∗
∫
∞
0
min {h∗ + TR∗, E(z˜∗)} dF ∗(h∗)
(10)
where E(z˜) =
∫
z˜
0
p(s)ds =
∫
z˜
0
wa(s)ds and E(z˜∗) = τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds. An individual house-
hold spends min{wh + TR,E(z˜)} on home goods and a foreign household min{h∗ +
TR∗, E(z˜∗)}. Note that TR is only positive if the income of (some of the) home households
exceeds E(z˜), otherwise TR = 0. The tariﬀ rebates for foreign households, in contrast, are
always positive, since Foreign always imports the lower-indexed goods produced by Home.
The foreign country produces only goods in [z˜∗,∞) of which [z˜,∞) are possibly ex-
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ported. Foreign labor market equilibrium therefore requires
N∗
∫
∞
0
h∗dF ∗(h∗) =
∫
∞
z˜
∗
a∗(z)Q∗(z)dz +
∫
∞
z˜
a∗(z)Q(z)dz. (11)
with Q(z) = N [1− F (E(z)− TR)/w)] and Q∗(z) = N ∗[1− F (E(z)− TR∗)].
Households will only buy the higher-indexed commodities produced by Foreign when
their income exceeds E(z˜). Consequently, the labor market equilibrium condition in Foreign
can be rewritten as
L∗ = N
∫
∞
0
max {wh + TR−E(z˜), 0} dF (h)
+N∗
∫
∞
0
max {h∗ + TR∗ − E(z˜∗), 0} dF ∗(h∗).
(12)
A home household spendsmax {wh + TR−E(z˜), 0} and a foreign householdmax {h∗ + TR∗ −E(z˜∗)
on foreign goods.
Since both economies are linked by trade, Walras’ law implies that equations (10) and
(12) are identical in the equilibrium they accomplish and can therefore be eﬀectively sub-
stituted by the condition for balanced trade. Hence, goods market equilibrium worldwide
is governed by
N ∗
∫
∞
0
min
{
h∗ + TR∗
w
,
E(z˜∗)
w
}
dF ∗(h∗) =
N
∫
∞
0
max
{
h +
TR
w
−
E(z˜)
w
, 0
}
dF (h).
(13)
The ﬁrst row represents the value of the home country’s exports which in equilibrium have
to be equal to its value of imports. We will refer to this equation as the trade balance
condition. The particular form it takes crucially depends on whether or not all households
in Foreign are rich enough to aﬀord the higher-ranged goods that Foreign produces. When
some of the foreign households are so poor that they can only aﬀord to consume goods
produced in Home, the trade balance condition is a positively sloped function of w. A
lower relative wage rate of home laborers then leads to an increase in the purchasing power
of those poor foreign households which indirectly increases the demand for home labor.
To restore equilibrium, Home has to reduce the range of goods it produces which calls
for an increase in w. However, when the relative home wage is suﬃciently low so that all
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foreign households can aﬀord foreign products, the trade balance condition is vertical. Any
wage rise in Home translates completely into higher spending on foreign goods by home
households, which in equilibrium exactly matches the increase in Foreign’s import value
due to higher prices of home goods.
Equations (2), (3), (4), (5), and (13) deﬁne a system of equations jointly determining
the equilibrium values of z˜, z˜∗, w, u, and u∗. In the next sections we will use the model to
infer the consequences of trade policy when preferences are non-homothetic. At this point,
it is instructive to compare the present model with the Dornbusch, Fischer & Samuelson
(1977) model (henceforth DFS model). DFS assume that all households have identical and
homothetic preferences over a ﬁxed range of commodities. This implies that each household
spends a constant share of expenditure on the ith commodity. As part of the equilibrium, a
household spends one part of its income on goods produced in Home and the remaining part
on goods produced in Foreign. As a consequence of homothetic preferences, a lower price
of home goods is an incentive for all households to substitute the relative more expensive
foreign goods for home goods. This is in stark contrast to our model. There a fall in the
price of goods produced in Home generates a higher demand for foreign produced goods
due to the presence of demand complementarities. The decline in the price of lower-indexed
goods increases the real income of households, which only increases consumption of higher-
indexed goods. The demand complementarities are asymmetric however, so that if the
price of higher-ranked goods falls, demand for lower-indexed goods does not increase.
A direct implication of this is that in the DFS model the trade balance condition is
positively sloped (from the origin), whereas in our model the trade balance condition is
only positively sloped above a certain level of w. Moreover, the assumption of homothetic-
ity in the DFS model implies that redistribution policies within a country do not aﬀect
aggregate variables such as z˜, z˜∗, and w. In our model, as is apparent from (13), the dis-
tribution of income aﬀects the endogenous variables as a result of the asymmetric demand
complementarities.
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3 Trade policy with homogeneous population
To build intuition of the implications of asymmetric demand complementarities, this sec-
tion neglects income distribution eﬀects and assumes that households in each country are
homogeneous and endowed with one unit of eﬀective labor, i.e., h = h∗ = 1. Moreover, it
only considers the case in which households in both countries are rich enough in equilibrium
to consume goods produced in Foreign, implying that in both countries marginal income is
spent in Foreign, that is, w + TR > E(z˜) and 1 + TR∗ > E(z˜∗). Consequently, the initial
equilibrium will be on the vertical part of the trade balance condition.
Making use of the expressions for consumer expenditures (4) and (5), while substituting
for tariﬀ revenues, the balanced trade condition for homogeneous population becomes,
N∗τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
a(s)ds = Nτ [1−
∫
z˜
0
a(s)ds] (14)
provided that
w < w¯ ≡
[
1 +
N ∗τ ∗
Nτ
] [
1−
∫
z˜
z˜
∗
a(s)ds
]
−1
(15)
since we assume that foreign households are rich enough to consume some of the goods
they produce themselves. The equilibrium condition reduces to the Matsuyama (2000)
case when there are no tariﬀ impediments (so that z˜∗ = z˜). For positive tariﬀs, the relation
between z˜∗ and z˜ is governed by (2) and (3). Since A(z) is strictly decreasing in z, this
implies that we can express z˜∗ as a function of z˜. Hence,
z˜∗ = A−1 [τA(z˜)τ ∗] .
Inserting this in (14) the balanced trade condition becomes a function of z˜ only:1
N∗τ ∗
∫
A
−1
[τA(z˜)τ
∗
]
0
a(s)ds = Nτ [1−
∫
z˜
0
a(s)ds]. (16)
This expression deﬁnes the equilibrium value of z˜ and is independent of w as long as
w < w¯.2 This reﬂects the fact that, when the consumption baskets of home and foreign
1
For a similar analysis see Obstfeld & Rogoff (1999).
2
Likewise, we could have expressed equation (16) as a function of z˜
∗
only, with obviously no consequences
for the analysis whatsoever. Only when graphically illustrating trade policy effects, it will prove convenient
to be able to switch among the two equivalent specifications of (16).
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households both include higher-indexed foreign goods, any change in w only works through
via its impact on z˜ and z˜∗. Demand complementarities also explain why direct expenditure
eﬀects of changes in w are absent in (16). Any wage rise in Home translates completely
into higher spending on foreign goods by home households, which in equilibrium exactly
matches the increase in Foreign’s import bill due to the higher prices for home goods.
The model’s equilibrium is complete when we combine the equilibrium z˜ with (2), which
yields the equilibrium value of w. Using the equilibrium value of w in (3), we know z˜∗.
Figure 1 illustrates the initial tariﬀ distorted equilibrium achieved. In the ﬁgure, the TB
and A(z)τ schedules jointly determine equilibrium, while the A(z)/τ ∗ schedule is only used
to read oﬀ the equilibrium z˜∗ that results. Note that we have drawn equilibrium on the
vertical stretch of the trade balance condition TB, which is in line with the condition above.
For w > w¯, however, the trade balance condition becomes positively sloped as it depends
on w. Formally,
[N∗(τ ∗ − 1) +Nτ ]
∫
z˜
∗
0
a(s)ds = Nτ
[
1−
∫
z˜
z˜
∗
a(s)ds
]
−N ∗/w.
This is the case when only home households are rich enough to buy foreign goods, which
we will however not consider here. In our analysis we will also assume that equilibrium
remains on the vertical part of the TB schedule.
In the initial tariﬀ ridden equilibrium, the highest-indexed good a household in Home
and Foreign consumes and thereby the utility level she attains is obtained from combining
(4) with (6) and (5) with (7):
∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds = w −
∫
z˜
0
wa(s)ds (17)
∫
u
∗
z˜
∗
a∗(s)ds = 1−
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds. (18)
We follow Matsuyama (2000) and assume that Home has an absolute disadvantage in the
production of all z, that is, a∗(z) > a(z) for all z. This ensures that w < 1 and that (17)
and (18) satisfy z˜∗ < z˜ < u < u∗ making foreign households richer than home households
in equilibrium. home households consume all the goods produced in home plus some
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foreign goods (z˜ < u), while foreign households consume all the goods home households
consume plus some (u < u∗). When 1 < w < w, however, Home is the richer country and
u∗ < u.3 It follows from the combination of the assumption on A(z), b(z)/p(z), b(z)/p∗(z)
and a∗(z) > a(z), that Home specializes in goods whose demand is characterized by low
income elasticities while Foreign in goods with high demand elasticities.
Unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization
Consider ﬁrst the case in which Home reduces uniformly its tariﬀs on higher-indexed im-
ports from Foreign, that is dτ < 0 while keeping τ ∗ unchanged. For the supply side the
decline in tariﬀs implies a loss in competitiveness and therefore Home will produce a lower
range of goods. The demand eﬀect is that lower import tariﬀs imply more demand for
imported goods and the trade balance goes in deﬁcit. Hence, at impact both eﬀects imply
a lower z˜. By total diﬀerentiation of (2), (3), and (14) it appears that also the equilibrium
eﬀect of lowering Home’s tariﬀs is a lower z˜:
̂˜z
τ̂
=
1
D
[
ζ(z˜∗)Nτ
∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds+N ∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗
]
> 0 (19)
where ζ(z) ≡ [aˆ(z)/zˆ − a∗(z)/zˆ] = −Aˆ(z)/zˆ > 0 measures the elasticity of Home’s rel-
ative eﬃciency with respect to the borderline commodity z = z˜, z˜∗ and where D =
ζ(z˜∗)Nwτa(z˜)z˜ + ζ(z˜)N ∗wτ ∗a(z˜∗)z˜∗ > 0. A caret over a variable indicates a propor-
tional rate of change, for example τ̂ = dτ/τ . A unilateral reduction of Home’s tariﬀs thus
unambiguously lowers the range of goods Home produces. The higher-ranged non-traded
goods of Home are ‘lost’ to Foreign and Home now imports these goods.
The direct consequence of the loss of home industries at impact is that, keeping wages
ﬁxed, the real income of home households increases. The range of goods Home loses to
Foreign have become cheaper, which raises Home’s real income. Note that the price decline
of previously imported goods in Home does not aﬀect real income, since the gain due to
lower prices is exactly compensated by the decrease in income due to lower tariﬀ rebates.
3
This case implies either z˜
∗
< z˜ < u
∗
< u or z˜
∗
< u
∗
≤ z˜ < u, which is however not relevant for the
comparative static results.
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The asymmetry of demand complementarities imply that the real income gain in Home is
spent on imports only. Next to switching consumption of previously non-traded goods to
imported goods (dz˜ > 0), home households thus also increase the range of goods consumed
(du > 0). For Foreign, there is no real income eﬀect due to the lower z˜, since the tariﬀ
inclusive price in Foreign does not change.
But when z˜ changes, also other eﬀects occur. This depends on the extent by which
z˜ decreases though. We illustrate this in Figure 2, where the tariﬀ shock is given by the
leftward shift of the schedule A(z)τ and by the leftward shift of the trade balance condition.
As the ﬁgure shows, the eﬀects on w and z˜∗ are ambiguous and depend on the relative
change in industries due to the lower level of protection (the shift of A(z)τ), compared to
the relative change in z˜ that is required to retain balance of payments equilibrium (the
shift of TB). In the ﬁgure this is indicated by depicting two diﬀerent leftward shifts of the
trade balance condition. The vertical intercept (a) denotes the case in which the percentage
change in τ leads to a larger than percentage change in range of goods Home produces,
so that the equilibrium wage in Home increases to w
A
and the range of goods exported
declines to [0, z˜∗
A
]. The vertical intercept (b) depicts a case where the percentage change
in τ leads to a lower than percentage change in range of goods Home produces and home
wages fall to w
B
, while the range of goods exported to Foreign expands [0, z˜∗
B
]. When
the leftward shift of the balanced trade condition exactly matches the leftward shift of the
A(z)τ schedule, no eﬀects on w and z˜∗ occur.
Formally, the eﬀects on w and z˜∗ are given by
ŵ
τ̂
=
ζ(z˜∗)
D
[
Nτwa(z˜)z˜ − ζ(z˜)Nτ
∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
(20)
̂˜z∗
τ̂
= −
1
D
[
Nτwa(z˜)z˜ − ζ(z˜)Nτ
∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
(21)
so that wˆ/τˆ  0 and z˜∗/τˆ  0 if wa(z˜)z˜/
∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds  ζ(z˜). The right-hand-side of
this condition gives the extent to which Home loses goods to Foreign due to diminished
competitiveness. The value of this elasticity is between zero and inﬁnity. When ζ(z˜) is close
to zero, comparative advantage hardly changes when z changes – the curve is ﬂat – and
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a relative wage increase implies that many goods are lost to Foreign. The left-hand-side of
the condition gives the import value of the outlays on the marginal commodity z˜, reﬂecting
the income eﬀect of lower tariﬀs. If this ratio is one, then everything home households
‘save’ by not longer buying domestic goods is spent on foreign goods. This reduces the
relative demand for home labor and only when this is matched by an identical relative
decline in home labor demand due to the loss in competitiveness, will the factor terms of
trade remain intact.4 In Figure 2, this would result in a proportional shift of both curves
so that τˆ = zˆ.5 When, however, due to lower protection the loss of industries is larger
(smaller) than required to get trade balance equilibrium, Home’s relative wage will have to
go down (up) to adjust the number of industries upward (downward).6
Making the comparison with the DFS analysis, we note that also there a unilateral
reduction of home tariﬀs reduces the range of goods Home produces. However, in the DFS
analysis Home’s relative wage rate unambiguous falls when τ declines. In their model,
the induced fall in the price of home goods generates an income eﬀect as discussed before
and a substitution eﬀect. Due to the assumption of homothetic preferences in the form
of Cobb Douglas utility function, the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect so
that the demand for home goods increases. Consequently, Home’s factor terms of trade
unambiguously deteriorate when it unilaterally reduces its tariﬀ. In our model, however,
also the slope of the A(z˜)/τ curve matters. Since there is no restriction on the magnitude
of ζ(z˜), the terms of trade can also improve for Home.
Let us also consider a unilateral reduction of foreign tariﬀs (dτ ∗ < 0, dτ = 0). Lower
foreign trade taxes means that Foreign is now able to obtain previously nontraded com-
modities at a lower price from Home through trade and consequently Foreign ‘loses’ some
4
This is not to say that the wages in both countries do not change. In fact, to reach a viable equilibrium,
both countries should witness identical percentage declines in their absolute wage rates.
5
To avoid cluttering we did not portray different curves for the A(z)τ schedule in Figure 2. In line with
the argumentation in the text, the (b) case A(z)τ schedule should have been drawn flatter than the (a)
case A(z)τ schedule.
6
As required to restore the balanced trade equilibrium. This can be most easily seen by taking the total
derivative of (14), which yields wa(z˜)z˜
̂
z˜ +N
∗
τ
∗
a(z˜
∗
)z˜
∗
̂
z˜
∗
=
[∫
u
z˜
a(s)ds
]
τˆ .
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industries to Home. The direct consequence of the larger range of imported goods (z˜∗
increases) is that the real income of foreign households goes up, while that of the home
households does not change. Due to asymmetric demand complementarities the increase in
real income is spent on foreign goods only rather than on imports from Home. Regardless
which country reduces its tariﬀs, therefore, the ensuing real income gains are spent on
foreign goods. This implies that the equilibrium eﬀects on the endogenous variables will
be highly similar as before. Due to lowering its tariﬀs, Foreign unambiguously increases
the number of goods it imports (z˜∗ increases), while the eﬀects on relative wages and the
number of goods exported are ambiguous. Formally,
̂˜z∗
τ̂ ∗
= −
1
D
[
ζ(z˜)N ∗τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds+Nτwa(z˜)z˜
]
< 0 (22)
ŵ
τ̂ ∗
= −
ζ(z˜)
D
[
N ∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ − ζ(z˜∗)N ∗τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds
]
≷ 0 (23)
̂˜z
τ̂ ∗
=
1
D
[
N ∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ − ζ(z˜∗)N∗τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds
]
≷ 0. (24)
Note that also the condition that settles the eﬀect on w and z˜ is similar in nature to the
one derived before: if ζ(z˜∗) > (<) wa(z˜∗)z˜∗/
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds, then Foreign’s factor terms of
trade improve (deteriorate) and z˜ goes up (down).7 As before, and in contrast with the
DFS model, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction does not necessarily improve a country’s terms of
trade.
The analysis so far can also be used to discuss the consequences of multilateral tariﬀ
reductions, that is when dτ/τ = dτ ∗/τ ∗ < 0. This is useful since tariﬀ reductions typically
7
The effects can also be easily illustrated in a graph like Figure 1, provided that we express the trade
balance condition as a function of z˜
∗
only. Then, a lower τ
∗
implies that both the A(z)/τ
∗
and the trade
balance condition shift to the right, which leads to an unambiguous increase of z˜
∗
. The effects on w and
z˜ would then depend on the relative shift of both curves, just as it was the case when Home reduced its
tariffs.
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are the outcome of bilateral or multilateral negotiations between countries based on reci-
procity. The results for multilateral tariﬀ reductions are obtained by adding the eﬀects of
the unilateral reductions of τ and τ ∗. From the previous discussion it follows straightfor-
wardly that lower world tariﬀs unambiguously reduce the range of nontraded goods, that
is dz˜ < 0 and dz˜∗ > 0. In terms of Figure 2, a small uniform decrease in both tariﬀ rates
shifts the schedule A(z)/τ ∗ to the right and the schedule A(z)τ and the trade balance
condition (16) to the left. The eﬀect on the factor terms of trade is still ambiguous. A
uniform tariﬀ decrease has zero eﬀect on relative wages only if the relative decline in labor
due to the loss of competitiveness exactly matches the relative decline in labor demand.
In contrast, DFS show that a uniform reduction in world tariﬀ rates reduces the range of
nontraded goods but has no eﬀect on the relative wage rate when the income share in world
income is equal for each country. Multilateral tariﬀ reductions lower the relative price in
each country exactly in proportion to the tariﬀ.
Welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization
The welfare eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions – unilateral and multilateral – can be decomposed
into a factor terms of trade eﬀect and a tariﬀ revenue eﬀect. Total diﬀerentiation of (4)
and (5) yields, for a home household
a∗(u)du =
[∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
wˆ − (τ − 1)a∗(z˜)z˜̂˜z (25)
and, for a foreign household
a∗(u∗)du∗ = −
[
w
∫
z˜
∗
0
a(s)ds
]
ŵ + (τ ∗ − 1)wa(z˜∗)z˜∗̂˜z∗. (26)
The ﬁrst terms on the right hand side of both equations represent the factor terms of trade
eﬀect weighted by the country’s value of imports. The second term reﬂects the change in
tariﬀ revenues on account of lower tariﬀs due to the change in the quantity traded, holding
tariﬀ rates constant. It can also be interpreted as the change in deadweight loss caused by
the change in import volume. Since we started from a tariﬀ distorted equilibrium there is
also a price eﬀect of lower tariﬀs on the tariﬀ revenues, holding quantity constant. This
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price eﬀect, however, drops out since with homogeneous population, the gains of lower
prices for imported goods is exactly matched by lower rebated tariﬀ revenues.
Applying the equilibrium eﬀects of unilateral or multilateral tariﬀ reductions, then
shows that the total welfare eﬀects are ambiguous and critically depend on the induced
change of w. To see this, consider a unilateral tariﬀ reduction by Home. Then, if ŵ < 0,
no clear conclusions can be drawn for Home, since the total welfare eﬀect depends on the
relative magnitude of the terms of trade eﬀect and the tariﬀ revenue eﬀect.8 Foreign gains
though. Note that equations (25) and (26) suggest that the lower Home’s initial imports,
the more likely it is that also Home gains from lower tariﬀs. This result is in accordance with
DFS. However, results diﬀer sharply from DFS if ŵ > 0. Home’s terms of trade improve and
allows home households to shift expenditure away from home goods towards higher-indexed
goods. This eﬀect is reinforced by higher tariﬀ revenues, increasing the consumption basket
of home households unambiguously: du > 0. Foreign’s welfare declines though: not only
does Foreign witness a deterioration in its factor terms of trade but also less tariﬀ revenues
accrue. In this case Foreign loses industries at the higher end of the spectrum but gains
industries at the lower end. The diﬀerence in results is due to nonhomotheticity.
This analysis can be applied to both unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization.
The general inference is that a country gains from a unilateral tariﬀ reduction when its
factor terms of trade improves, irrespective of which country lowers the tariﬀs. When the
terms of trade deteriorate, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction is bad for a country, unless it is the
incipient country, that is: when it has lowered the tariﬀ itself. Then, a worsened factor
terms of trade might be compensated by the unambiguous increase in the range of imports.
For multilateral tariﬀ reductions the results for the incipient country obviously hold for
both countries.
The importance of the factor terms of trade for the welfare eﬀects of trade policy is
in line with the standard literature on the welfare eﬀects of trade policy. The point in
case is, however, that in our analysis a tariﬀ reduction does not necessarily lead to a terms
8
Of course, this ambiguity is absent when starting from a free-trade equilibrium. In this case welfare
changes are determined completely by the changes in factor terms of trade.
18
of trade deterioration for the incipient country. Hence, the general notion that unilateral
trade liberalization is good for the exporting partner country does not hold in our analysis.
We ﬁnally note that in our analysis also the pattern of product cycles emerges: new
industries appear in Foreign, and some older foreign industries are taken over by Home.
Such product cycles do not appear in DFS since the range of products is ﬁxed. In our
model, the upper range of products is open. In this context, it is interesting to note that
successive unilateral trade liberalizations by Foreign generate product cycle phenomena,
similar to those discussed by Vernon (1966) and Linder (1961). Unilateral reduction in
foreign tariﬀs may lead to a fall in Home’s terms of trade and industries at the lower end
in Foreign move to Home over time. Relatively cheaper home commodities allow foreign
households to shift expenditure away from home goods to higher-indexed foreign goods
thereby providing the economic climate for new industries to be developed in Foreign.
4 Heterogeneous Population
In this section we consider diﬀerences in income distribution, that is we assume that the
distributions F (h) and F ∗(h∗) are nondegenerated. This is particularly interesting when
income of the households with low skill levels is so low in equilibrium that they are not
able to consume higher-indexed goods produced in Foreign. For the sake of concreteness,
we therefore assume that there are two types of households in both countries, those with
low skill levels (h
L
, h∗
L
) and those with high skill levels (h
H
, h∗
H
), which are moreover equal
in number. Hence, in Home there are N/2 households that do not import, so that u
L
< z˜,
while in Foreign there are N∗/2 households who only import, that is: for those households
u∗
L
< z˜∗.
For the analysis of trade liberalization this implies that the eﬀects now become crucially
dependent on how the tariﬀ revenues are distributed, since also households that do not im-
port might then be aﬀected by trade policy. Many tariﬀ revenue distribution schemes are
possible. In the remainder of the analysis we consider three of them: (1) tariﬀ revenues are
rebated to households proportional to their imports (proportionality scheme); (2) tariﬀ rev-
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enues are distributed evenly over households, regardless of individual consumption patterns
(per capita scheme); and (3) all tariﬀ revenues are rebated to the poor in society (pro poor
scheme). As the distribution schemes may diﬀer between countries, this delineates a total
of 9 diﬀerent cases. Each case has its own particular budget constraints and concomitant
trade balance equation, which are given in the appendix. For here it suﬃces to say that
since Foreign comprises households that spend their marginal income on home goods, the
trade balance condition also depends on w. In terms of Figure 1: then the TB curve is
upward sloping for all values of w.
For analytical convenience, we put τ = τ ∗ = 1 in this section, as if initially both
countries do not levy tariﬀs. The appendix gives the analytical results for positive tariﬀs.
The subscripted short-hand notations we use in the appendix to distinguish between the
diﬀerent cases simplify considerably. These are given in Table 1, which for the sake of
completeness also includes the values for the homogenous population case.
For a unilateral tariﬀ reduction in Home, we then derive
̂˜z
τ̂
=
1
D
ii
∗
[
Γ
i
ζ(z˜∗)N
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds+
1
2
N ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ +
1
2
ζ(z˜∗)N ∗h∗
L
]
> 0 (27)
with D
ii
∗ > 0 for all i, i∗. Irrespective of the particular tariﬀ distribution scheme, therefore,
unilateral trade liberalization by Home always leads to a loss of home industries. Due to
the dependency of the balanced trade condition on w, we note that compared to the case of
homogenous population, an additional term appears in (27). This reﬂects the fact that poor
households in Foreign only buy low-indexed home goods. Consequently, everything else the
same, Home must free more labor to accommodate the additional demand by Foreign poor
households for their goods. Likewise, if all tariﬀ revenues in Home are rebated to the poor
population (pro poor scheme), the loss of home industries is mitigated since the additional
income is spent on domestic products only (Γ
i
= 0).
The ambiguity on wˆ and ̂˜z∗ from the homogeneous case carries over to the heterogenous
case:
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ŵτ̂
=
ζ(z˜∗)
D
ii
∗
[
1
2
Nwa(z˜)z˜ − Γ
i
ζ(z˜)N
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
≷ 0 (28)
̂˜z∗
τ̂
= −
1
D
ii
∗
[
1
2
Nwa(z˜)z˜ − Γ
i
ζ(z˜)N
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
≷ 0. (29)
The condition that settles whether or not Home’s factor terms of trade increases upon
trade liberalization is similar as before, but its strictness depends on the case considered.
Formally: wˆ/τˆ  0 if wa(z˜)z˜/
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds  2Γ
i
ζ(z˜). Everything else the same, it is more
likely that Home’s factor terms of trade improve in the proportionality case than in the per
capita case, whereas Home’s terms of trade will always deteriorate when tariﬀ revenues are
only rebated to the poor. If the latter is the case, then also Home’s export range increases
unambiguously when home tariﬀs go down (Γ
i
= 0). Since poor households in Home only
buy domestic goods, the income the rich households in Home ‘save’ by not longer buying
domestic goods is never completely spent on foreign goods and the relative demand decline
for home labor always falls short of the negative supply eﬀect due to loss in competitiveness.
Unilateral trade liberalization by Foreign leads to:
̂˜z∗
τ̂ ∗
= −
1
D
ii
∗
[
Γ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜)N∗ +
1
2
Nwa(z˜)z˜ +
1
2
ζ(z˜)N∗h∗
L
]
< 0. (30)
The sign of (30) is as before, but the extent to which Foreign loses industries to Home
varies across cases. The eﬀects on w and ̂˜z are:
̂˜z
τ̂ ∗
=
1
D
ii
∗
[
1
2
N∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ − Γ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜∗)N ∗
]
≷ 0 (31)
ŵ
τ̂ ∗
= −
ζ(z˜)
D
ii
∗
[
1
2
N∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ − Γ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜∗)N ∗
]
≷ 0. (32)
Again the similarities with the homogeneous population case are apparent, be it that now
also the way tariﬀ revenues are distributed matter: Home’s factor terms of trade increases
upon trade liberalization if wa(z˜)z˜ > 2Γ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜).
Our assumptions on income distributions and the allocation of tariﬀ revenues now war-
rant a discussion of the induced welfare changes for each type of households in both coun-
tries. Consequently, (25) and (26) become:
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a∗(u
H
)du
H
=
[∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
wˆ − γ
i
[∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
τˆ (33)
wa(u
L
)du
L
= γ
i
[∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
τˆ (34)
a∗(u∗
H
)du∗
H
= −
[∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds
]
wˆ − γ
i
∗
τˆ ∗ (35)
wa(u∗
L
)du∗
L
= −
[∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds
]
wˆ + γ
i
∗
τˆ ∗ (36)
with γ
i
= {0, 1/2, 1} and γ∗
i
∗
= {0, [
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds−
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds]/2,
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds} evaluated
at τ = τ ∗ = 1.
As before, the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization depend on the eﬀect on a country’s
terms of trade, except for the poor in Home. Since the poor households in Home do not
import, they are insulated from the factor terms of trade eﬀect of policy changes. For
poor households in Foreign, as well as for rich households, the terms of trade changes work
in the same direction as in the homogeneous population case. Equations (33)-(36) also
underscore the importance of the particular tariﬀ revenue redistribution scheme. When
tariﬀ revenues are redistributed from rich to poor households, this provides a channel by
which tariﬀ reductions work against the poor in society, since it lowers the income they get
via tariﬀ rebates.9
This leads to the following conclusions. A terms of trade improvement is always good
for the rich in society, irrespective of which country liberalizes trade, but also irrespective
of the tariﬀ revenue redistribution scheme. In fact, redistributing tariﬀ revenues from rich
to poor households is welfare improving for the rich. Such redistribution might even allow
rich households to gain when the terms of trade deteriorate. For the poor, the virtuous
eﬀect of a more favorable factor terms of trade depends very much on (a) which country
9
For positive tariffs, equations (33)-(36) also incorporate a term with
̂
z˜ and
̂
z˜
∗
that reflects the quantity
effect of the tariff revenue change (as opposed to the price effect that τˆ and τˆ
∗
constitute). The way the
quantity effect works through on the welfare of poor and rich housholds is obviously the same as that for
the price effect.
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liberalizes trade, and (b) how the tariﬀ revenues are redistributed across households. When
the latter involves a redistribution from rich to poor households, we see that the poor in
the incipient country are always worse oﬀ compared to the situation when tariﬀ revenues
are distributed proportionally. For the welfare eﬀects of multilateral tariﬀ reductions, this
implies that these are less positive for poor households, and might even become negative,
when a government pursues an income redistribution policy in favor of the poor. When
preferences are nonhomothetic, trade liberalization reduces the eﬃcacy of pro poor income
redistribution policies.
Like in the homogeneous population case, we note ﬁnally that both unilateral and mul-
tilateral tariﬀ reductions lead to the emergence of product cycles if dw < 0. In contrast
to the homogeneous case, however, the birth of new industries is primarily driven by the
higher purchasing power of rich foreign households. Their consumption basket increases
the more when trade is liberalized, and the larger is the share of tariﬀ revenues allocated
to the poor foreign households. This leads to the interesting observation that the more pro
poor the income redistribution policy, the more eﬀective trade liberalization is in spurring
the birth of new industries (innovation). Since we have seen above that such redistribution
policies reduce the welfare gains of trade liberalization for poor households, when decid-
ing on the particular redistribution policy, the government faces the dilemma of choosing
between the (potential) beneﬁts of innovation for all in the future and the current welfare
gains of the poor now.
5 Conclusion
Traditionally, international economists make the simplifying assumption of homothetic pref-
erences when analyzing the eﬀects of trade policy. This assumption implies that all goods
have the same unitary income elasticities and that poor and rich households consume all
available goods in the same proportion. Homotheticity has certainly its justiﬁcation when
analyzing trade policy questions between countries characterized by similar per capita in-
come. When considering issues of trade and development between rich and poor countries
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the assumption of a negligible income eﬀect seems less appropriate. The lower is the in-
come level of a country, the more likely it is that its poorest households are isolated from
the broader economy. Eﬀects of lower trade taxes might then not pass through to those
households and the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization are then more a matter of income
growth than of (relative) price declines. Standard trade models based on homothetic pref-
erences are not suitable to address these issues, even though they seem highly relevant in
assessing the consequences of better market access for developing countries.
In this paper we therefore abandon the assumption of homothetic preferences and look at
the consequences of trade liberalization when preferences are non-homothetic. To this end
we have used the analytical framework of Matsuyama (2000) and have extended it to include
trade taxes. The production side is characterized by a continuum of goods, where goods are
ordered in terms of comparative advantage and desirability in consumption. The demand
side entails nonhomothetic preferences, which are modeled by assuming that consumers
are satiated after the consumption of one unit. As a consequence, when household income
increases, this takes the form of adding higher-indexed goods to the consumption basket
and not of increased consumption of the goods already consumed. This implies that poor
households in society have diﬀerent consumption baskets than rich households, just like poor
and rich households in developing countries have diﬀerent consumption baskets than their
counterparts in developed countries. It also implies that the way governments distribute
tariﬀ revenues among poor and rich households becomes important in gauging the eﬀects
of trade liberalization. To apply the model to trade liberalization between developed and
developing countries, we assume that the world consists of a poor, developing country
(Home) and a rich, developed country (Foreign). The poor country has a comparative
advantage in the production of the lower range of goods and specializes in goods with
low income elasticity of demand. The rich country on the other hand, has a comparative
advantage in the production of the higher-spectrum of goods and hence is specialized in
the commodities with high income elasticity of demand.
Our paper shows that in the presence of nonhomothetic preferences the eﬀects of trade
liberalization are neither standard, nor straightforward. In particular we have looked at
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the consequences of unilateral and multilateral reductions of tariﬀs for (i) the ranges of
goods produced and traded by each country, (ii) the terms of trade, and (iii) welfare, all
under diﬀerent schemes of tariﬀ redistribution and under diﬀerent assumptions regarding
the homogeneity of households. The main results can be summarized as follows.
First, when a country reduces its tariﬀs, it unambiguously leads to a loss of domestic
industries to the other country. However, in contrast to the standard literature, trade lib-
eralization does not necessarily deteriorate the terms of trade of the incipient country. This
depends on the extent by which the country loses goods due to diminished competitiveness,
compared to what is required to get trade balance equilibrium.
Second, the terms of trade eﬀect is highly important in determining the welfare eﬀects
of trade liberalization. The general outcome is that a country gains from a tariﬀ reduction,
regardless which country lowers the tariﬀs, whenever its terms of trade improves. When the
terms of trade deteriorate, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction is always bad for a country, unless
it is the incipient country. Then, a worsened factor terms of trade might be compensated
by the unambiguous increase in the range of imports.
Third, when households are heterogeneous in the sense that some are poorer than others,
the welfare eﬀects for households of trade liberalization highly depend on the particular
tariﬀ distribution scheme a government applies. When tariﬀ revenues are redistributed
from rich to poor households, an additional channel occurs by which tariﬀ reductions work
against the poor in society, since it lowers the income they get via tariﬀ rebates. We are then
able to show that a terms of trade improvement is always good for the rich in society, but
not necessarily for the poor. In fact, the more in favor of the poor the tariﬀ redistribution
scheme is, the better trade liberalization works out for the rich and the worse it becomes
for the poor. This sheds new light on the eﬃcacy of income redistribution policies in the
wake of ongoing trade liberalizations.
Fourth, our framework provides a link with the literature on product cycles, since due
to further economic integration new industries appear in the rich country, while some of
its older industries move to the developing country. As we show, when preferences are
nonhomothetic the birth of new industries is primarily driven by the higher purchasing
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power of rich households in the rich country. As a consequence, the more pro poor the
income redistribution policy of a government is, the more eﬀective trade liberalization is in
spurring the birth of new industries.
A
The diﬀerent cases we consider in the main text are delineated by the particular way the
tariﬀ revenues are rebated and the assumptions we make regarding the distribution of
households in each country. For an equal division of the total number of households over
poor and rich households and given that we assume that in equilibrium poor households in
each country do not buy the higher indexed goods from Foreign, the following expressions
for total tariﬀ revenues are due:
T =
N
2
(τ − 1)
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
T ∗ =
N∗
2
(τ ∗ − 1)
[∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds+
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds
]
For homogeneous population all tariﬀ distribution schemes yield tariﬀ rebates of (τ −
1)
∫
u
z˜
a∗(s)ds and (τ ∗ − 1)
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds per home and foreign household, respectively. For
heterogenous population, the diﬀerent tariﬀ distribution schemes imply the following tariﬀ
rebates per type of household:
TR
L
TR
H
TR
∗
L
TR
∗
H
proportionality 0 2T/N (τ ∗ − 1)
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds (τ ∗ − 1)
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds
per capita T/N T/N T ∗/N ∗ T ∗/N ∗
pro poor 2T/N 0 2T ∗/N ∗ 0
The budget constraints for homogenous population are given by (17) and (18) in the main
text. For heterogenous households, the case speciﬁc budget constraints become, for house-
holds in Home:∫
z˜
0
wa(s)ds+ A
j
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds = wh
H∫
u
L
0
wa(s)ds = wh
L
+B
j
[wh
H
−
∫
z˜
0
wa(s)ds]
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where A
j
= {1, (τ+1)/2, τ} andB
j
= {0, (τ−1)/(τ+1), (τ−1)/τ} for j = {proportionality,
per capita, pro poor}. For households in Foreign we get:
A∗
j
∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds+
∫
u
∗
H
z˜
∗
a∗(s)ds = h∗
H
+ C∗
j
∗
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds
D∗
j
∗
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds = h∗
L
+B∗
j
∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds.
where A∗
j
∗
= {1, (τ ∗ + 1)/2, τ ∗}, B∗
j
∗
= {0, (τ ∗ − 1)/2, τ ∗ − 1}, C∗
j
∗
= {0, (τ ∗ − 1)/2, 0},
and D∗
j
∗
= {1, (τ ∗ + 1)/2, 1}.
The balanced trade condition for heterogenous households becomes, instead of (14): N
∗
τ
∗
2
[∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)d
Nτ
2
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds. In combination with the case speciﬁc budget constraints, all balanced trade
conditions can be written as:
N ∗τ ∗
[
Φ∗
i
∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds−Θ∗
i
∗
h∗
L
]
= NτΦ
i
[
wh
H
−
∫
z˜
0
wa(s)ds
]
where:
Φ
i
= {1, 1/2,
1
τ + 1
,
1
2τ
},
Φ∗
i
∗
= {1, 1/2,
τ ∗
τ ∗ + 1
,
1
2τ ∗
},
Θ∗
i
∗
= {0, 1/2,
1
τ ∗ + 1
, 1/2},
for i = {proportionality, per capita, pro poor}.Total diﬀerentiation of this equation and
the two relative eﬃciency equations (2) and (3) yields, in matrix form and by using the
budget constraints above to substitute for [wh
H
−
∫
z˜
0
wa(s)ds]:

1 ζ(z˜) 0
−1 0 −ζ(z˜∗)
−Θ∗
i
∗
N ∗τ ∗h∗
L
Φ
i
Nτwa(z˜)z˜ Φ∗
i
∗
N∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗




wˆ̂˜ẑ˜z∗

 =


1 0
0 1
Γ
i
Nτ
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds −Γ∗
i
∗
N ∗τ ∗



 τˆ
τˆ ∗


with:
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Γ
i
= {1, 1/2, 1/2
1
τ + 1
, 0}, and
Γ∗
i
∗
= {
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds, [h∗
L
+
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds]/2, [h∗
L
+ τ ∗(2 + τ ∗)
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds]/
(τ ∗ + 1)2, [h∗
L
+ 2τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds]/2}
for i = {homogeneous, proportionality, per capita, pro poor}. Taking the inverse gives,


wˆ̂˜ẑ˜z∗

 = 1D
ii
∗


Φ
i
ζ(z˜∗)Nτwa(z˜)z˜ −ζ(z˜)Φ∗
i
∗
N∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ −ζ(z˜)ζ(z˜∗)
Φ∗
i
∗
N∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗
+ Θ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜∗)N ∗τ ∗h∗
L
Φ∗
i
∗
N∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ ζ(z˜∗)
−Φ
i
Nτwa(z˜)z˜
−Φ
i
Nτwa(z˜)z˜
− Θ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜)N ∗τ ∗h∗
L
ζ(z˜)




1 0
0 1
Γ
i
Nτ
∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds −Γ∗
i
∗
N ∗τ ∗



 τˆ
τˆ ∗


with D
ii
∗ = Φ
i
ζ(z˜∗)Nτwa(z˜)z˜ + Φ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜)N ∗τ ∗wa(z˜∗)z˜∗ + Θ∗
i
∗
ζ(z˜)ζ(z˜∗)N∗τ ∗h∗
L
> 0, ∀i, i∗.
The expressions (27)-(29) and (30)-(32) in the main text then readily follow.
The welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization are obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the case
speciﬁc budget constraints. This yields, for home households,
a∗(u
H
)du
H
= αH
i
[∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
wˆ − βH
i
[(τ − 1)a∗(z˜)z˜] ̂˜z − γ
i
[∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
τˆ
wa(u
L
)du
L
= αL
i
[∫
u
L
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
wˆ − βL
i
[(τ − 1)a∗(z˜)z˜] ̂˜z + γ
i
[∫
u
H
z˜
a∗(s)ds
]
τˆ
with:
αH
i
= {1, 1, 1, 1},
αL
i
= {1, 0, 0, 0},
βH
i
= {1, 1, 1/(τ + 1), 0},
βL
i
= {1, 0, τ/(τ + 1), 1},
γ
i
= {0, 0, τ/(τ + 1), 1}.
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For foreign households we obtain:
a∗(u∗
H
)du∗
H
= −αH
i
∗
[∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds
]
wˆ + βH
i
∗
[(τ ∗ − 1)wa(z˜∗)z˜∗] ̂˜z∗ − γ
i
∗
τˆ ∗
wa(u∗
L
)du∗
L
= −αL
i
∗
wˆ + βL
i
∗
[(τ ∗ − 1)wa(z˜∗)z˜∗] ̂˜z∗ + γ
i
∗
τˆ ∗
with:
αH
i
∗
= {1, 1, 2τ ∗/(τ ∗ + 1), τ ∗},
αL
i
∗
= {
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds,
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds,
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds− τ
∗
−1
τ
∗
+1
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds,
1
2
(τ ∗ + 1)
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds− 1
2
(τ ∗ − 1)
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds}
βH
i
∗
= {1, 1, τ ∗/(τ ∗ + 1), 0},
βL
i
∗
= {1, 0, 1/(τ ∗ + 1), 1},
γ
i
∗
= {0, 0, τ ∗[
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds−
∫
u
∗
L
0
wa(s)ds]/(τ ∗ + 1), τ ∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds}.
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Table 1: Short-hand notations for τ = τ ∗ = 1
i, i∗ Homogeneous Proportionality Per capita Pro poor
Φ
i
1 1/2 1/2 1/2
Φ∗
i
∗
1 1/2 1/2 1/2
Γ
i
1 1/2 1/4 0
Γ∗
i
∗
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds
1
2
[h∗
L
+ ...∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds]
1
4
[h∗
L
+ ...
...3
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds]
1
2
[h∗
L
+ ...
2
∫
z˜
∗
0
wa(s)ds]
Θ∗
i
∗
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
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Figure 1.-Trade policy equilibrium: the case of homogeneous population. 
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 Figure 2.-Unilateral reduction in Home country’s tariff for homogeneous population 
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